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Abstract
Background: Malaria is a major global health problem, often exacerbated by political instability,
conflict, and forced migration.
Objectives: To examine the impact of political upheaval and population displacement in Timor-
Leste (2006) on malaria in the country.
Method: Case study approach drawing on both qualitative and quantitative methods including
document reviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, site visits and analysis of routinely
collected data.
Findings: The conflict had its most profound impact on Dili, the capital city, in which tens of
thousands of people were displaced from their homes. The conflict interrupted routine malaria
service programs and training, but did not lead to an increase in malaria incidence. Interventions
covering treatment, insecticide treated nets (ITN) distribution, vector control, surveillance and
health promotion were promptly organized for internally displaced people (IDPs) and routine
health services were maintained. Vector control interventions were focused on IDP camps in the
city rather than on the whole community. The crisis contributed to policy change with the
introduction of Rapid Diagnostic Tests and artemether-lumefantrine for treatment.
Conclusions: Although the political crisis affected malaria programs there were no outbreaks of
malaria. Emergency responses were quickly organized and beneficial long term changes in
treatment and diagnosis were facilitated.
Background
Globally, malaria poses a threat to approximately 3.3 bil-
lion of the world's population with around 250 million
clinical cases annually and more than 1 million deaths,
mostly in children under 5 years of age [1].
In April and May 2006 serious political instability and
violence affected the newly independent Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste. The risk of infectious diseases in
conflict-affected settings is increased. Violent conflict
causes population displacement and destruction of infra-
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structure, as well as the reduction or disruption of health
services, including routine disease control programs,
which can lead to outbreaks [2-5]. Additionally, the lack
of clean water supplies, poor sanitation and waste man-
agement, overcrowding and poor shelter can increase the
risk of communicable diseases including malaria [2,6,7].
The increase of malaria morbidity and mortality due to
conflicts have been observed in many conflict areas such
as the Democratic Republic of Congo [8], and Afghanistan
[9,10]. The increase in malaria incidence in refugees and
displaced populations in African countries has been well
documented [11].
Malaria has always been one of the biggest public health
problems in Timor-Leste. Both Plasmodium falciparum and
Plasmodium vivax are present in the country, although
their precise distribution is unknown. Malaria incidence
typically increases in the rainy season (November to
April). The national cumulative Annual Clinical Malaria
Incidence (ACMI) based on syndromic diagnosis in 2005
was 144/1000 population, but varied substantially
between districts from 100 to 250 per 1000 population.
The Annual Parasite Incidence (API) based on laboratory-
confirmed diagnosis in 2006 was 38.5 per 1000 [12]. To
support the intervention, the MoH also developed
national strategies on malaria control [13] in line with the
World Health Organization's Roll Back Malaria Strategy
and broader control strategies for mosquito-borne dis-
eases [14]. The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria has substantially funded malaria control in
Timor-Leste since 2003 [15].
The 2006 crisis originated from alleged ethnically-based
discrimination within the military. The aggrieved soldiers,
mostly from the west of the country, left their barracks,
staged a protest and were dismissed. The detail of the
chronology of the 2006 political crisis is outlined else-
where [16]. Subsequently gang fights and street violence
ensued, with over 3000 homes burned down mostly in
Dili and displacement of approximately 15% of the coun-
try's population. The internally displaced people (IDPs)
sought refuge in camps, churches, convents and schools,
with some displaced from the capital city, Dili, to districts.
In Dili, more than 60 camps were established to provide
temporary shelter for displaced people [17].
This study was designed to assess and describe the impact
of the 2006 crisis on malaria and critically examine the
response by key agencies. It sought to identify key lessons
both for Timor-Leste and other similar settings, notably
urban areas affected by political instability and displace-
ment.
Methodology
This case study used both qualitative and quantitative
methods. The qualitative methods included document
reviews, key informant interviews, focus group discus-
sions and observations. The quantitative data were
derived from malaria morbidity data reported from the
IDP camps and health facilities to the Ministry of Health
(MoH).
Data collection was from September - November 2006 at
the same time as for the broader Health Sector Resilience
Study [17]. The study was conducted in Dili and four
other districts: Aileu, Baucau, Ermera and Lautem. The lat-
ter were selected to represent districts affected by the crisis,
two each in the East and West of the country. Institutions
and individuals selected for this study were identified in
consultation with the MoH and were chosen to reflect the
range of ways in which districts in different parts of the
country might be affected.
Major topics explored in this study included how malaria
interventions were organised, the types of malaria inter-
ventions delivered during the crisis, the surveillance sys-
tem used to monitor malaria cases within the IDP camps,
the major stakeholders involved in malaria control during
the crisis, the implications of the crisis for the malaria con-
trol program, and the lessons learned.
Table 1 presents a summary of the methods used and the
numbers of in-depth interviews and focus group discus-
sions (FGDs) undertaken. In-depth interviews were held
with policy makers and program implementers of the
MoH, non-governmental organizations, and United
Nations agencies notably the World Health Organization
(WHO). Thirty key informants selected on a purposeful
basis [18] were interviewed, each interview lasting
between thirty minutes and two hours. Interviews were
recorded digitally after obtaining consent, and then tran-
scribed in full.
Three FGDs were held, one with IDP camp managers and
Site Liaison Support staff, responsible for addressing the
needs of camp populations, the second with health work-
ers, and the third with a group of IDPs. These participants
were selected on the basis of either being affected by the
crisis and/or being involved in organizing emergency
responses. Participants were informed by the researchers
at least one week prior to the meeting schedule. The par-
ticipants of FGDs with health workers and IDPs num-
bered 12 people, while approximately 40 people attended
the 'FGD' with Camp Managers and SLS staff. The latter
was more akin to a group meeting, because the researchers
were given one hour in the middle of a weekly meetingConflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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held at the Ministry of Solidarity and Community Reinser-
tion, in which to explore issues with those present. Infor-
mal observations at three IDP camps and informal
discussions with a number of IDPs was also undertaken.
Participants of both in-depth interviews and FGDs were
provided with information sheets about the study and
informed consent was requested in English or Tetum, the
most widely spoken and official language. Interviews were
conducted after obtaining signed consent, or verbal con-
sent for those who could not read. No one refused to be
interviewed.
Quantitative data on malaria were obtained from the
Malaria Unit of the MoH and included aggregate cases
diagnosed on a syndromic basis and those cases which
had been confirmed with microscopy. Data on ITN distri-
bution were obtained from the MoH and NGOs involved
in the net distribution program particularly HealthNet
International (HNI), Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and
Timor-Leste Servisu Saude Intergradu (TAIS).
Data analysis
All in-depth interviews and FGDs were transcribed and
coded using Nvivo 7 software. Minutes of meetings and
relevant documents were reviewed and triangulated with
interview and FGD data.
Quantitative data were entered into MS Excel and graphs
generated. Malaria incidence rates for Dili district and the
rest of the country per 1000 population were calculated
for 2004-2007 using the denominator of the 2004 popu-
lation census figure. Population was based on the 2004
Census; the total country population was 924,624. Popu-
lation for Dili district was 167, 777. During the crisis an
estimated 70,000 people fled out from Dili to Districts in
2006 and 2007. A 'best estimate' of approximately 70,000
was deducted from Dili's population in view of displace-
ment of Dili's residents to districts inside Timor-Leste's
territory. The exact number of displaced population from
Dili to districts was unknown, estimates have been made
ranging 68,000 [19] to 75,000 [17]. The 70,000 used as
denominator for this study was drawn from these esti-
mates.
Ethical clearance
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Research
Ethics Committee, University of New South Wales (Ref:
HREC 06226). In the absence of a formal ethics review
structure in Timor-Leste, approval to conduct the study
was obtained from the MoH.
Results
Malaria morbidity trends
Figure 1 describes trends in monthly diagnoses of malaria
cases over the period 2004-2007. At country level, there is
no indication that the pattern of malaria for 2006 differed
substantially from previous years; the peak in early 2006
preceded the instability.
The malaria rates based in Dili District and the rest of the
country were estimated from clinically suspected cases
reported to the MoH. In Dili and other parts of the coun-
try, the malaria rates from May - November are lower than
the December - April period. In 2005 and 2006, the rates
in Dili were lower than those in the rest of the country.
However, in 2007, the rates in Dili, during the May -
November period, were higher than those from other
Table 1: Summary of qualitative methods used
In-depth interview Focus group discussion
Agency No. people interviewed Participants No. FGDs
Ministry of Health 8 Camp managers and Site Liaison Officers 1
World Health Organization 3 Health workers 1
Non-governmental organisations 4 Internally displaced persons 1
Cuban Medical Brigade 3
District Health Services 5
Government health workers delivering interventions at IDP 
camps
7
Total 30 3Conflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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parts of the country. This could reflect better surveillance
and recording, and/or some decline in control efforts
(Table 2). Rates in the rural districts also showed some
increases over the previous year during this period,
although they were lower than those in Dili.
Surveillance
The Surveillance Unit, MoH, continued to monitor 11 dis-
eases with outbreak potential in all health facilities and
IDP camps. Although surveillance was in disarray in the
early stage of the crisis, the actors involved in the emer-
gency response (MoH surveillance officer, WHO adviser,
Cuban Medical Brigade and NGOs) met within weeks to
agree on a number of essential diseases that had to be
reported to the Surveillance Unit, MoH [17]. As a result,
integrated weekly epidemiological surveillance data on
these diseases were reported from the last week of May
until the third week of December 2006. Surveillance data
on suspected malaria cases is presented in Figure 2, show-
ing an increase in June and gradual decrease thereafter.
The Figure also indicates the timeline of political instabil-
ity in 2006 in the country.
In addition, the surveillance activity during the first and
second week of the crisis [2nd to 17th June 2006] recorded
17 types of diseases reported: URTI (66%), skin diseases
(11%) and both suspected malaria and acute diarrhoea
contributing a further 7% each [20].
Diagnosis and Treatment
Malaria diagnosis in IDP camps relied on a syndromic
approach. Laboratory confirmation with microscopy was
carried out but was limited to Community Health Centers
and hospitals, some of which closed down, temporarily,
during the crisis [17].
Malaria treatment followed the standard MoH protocol
adopted in 2004. There had been an intensive effort
between the MoH and WHO before the crisis to introduce
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) for treat-
ing falciparum malaria. The WHO ordered around 39,000
doses of artemether-lumefantrine in anticipation of possi-
ble outbreaks and 50,000 rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits
using funding from the UN Flash Appeal which was
launched in June 2006. This accelerated the availability of
both ACT and RDT in the country.
Before the crisis, we have agreed to change the protocol to ACT.
We needed some time to find the budget to buy ACT, so we have
to wait. We are lucky because WHO donated 39,000 doses of
ACT, we just received it last two weeks.
MoH program implementer
Vector Control and Insecticide Treated Nets (ITNs)
Vector control activities were planned by the Vector Con-
trol Working Group, comprising MoH and other develop-
Monthly national trends of malaria cases in Timor-Leste 2004-2007 Figure 1
Monthly national trends of malaria cases in Timor-Leste 2004-2007. MalCase = malaria cases deriving from a combi-
nation of syndromic and microscopically confirmed diagnosis; BS = Blood Smear carried out to do confirmatory test with light 
microscopes; PosBS = Blood smear positive malaria parasite resulted from the blood test with light microscopes.Conflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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ment partners (NGOs and UN agencies). The Working
Group also coordinated ITN distribution, fogging and lar-
vaciding, and the training of health volunteers.
Prior to the crisis, routine ITN distribution strictly targeted
pregnant women through antenatal care services, and
children under 5 years of age. During the crisis, routine
ITN distributions were briefly interrupted in some dis-
tricts, notably in Dili in May and June 2006 (Figure 3).
The MoH and NGOs diverted ITN stocks from routine
programs to respond to the needs of IDPs.
Approximately 27000 ITNs were allocated to IDPs in three
districts: Dili, Baucau and Viqueque, with priority being
given to pregnant women and children under 5. About
90% of these ITNs were distributed to the IDPs in Dili.
Nonetheless, some reservations concerning the effective-
ness of ITN distribution and utilisation were expressed,
although a detailed assessment was never undertaken:
Bed net distribution in camps.. maybe it is not so much produc-
tive because it is very difficult to hang bed nets in the tents in a
proper way.. this unfortunately gives a false security to the peo-
ple.
UN Agency
...do people really use the bed nets that we distributed? This is
what I see as a big dilemma, even we have given them educa-
tion before giving bed nets, but we do not know whether these
people really sleep under nets at night time, who would go to see
them?...
MoH Policy Maker
Disparities occurred in some districts and even in Dili
some IDPs did not have access to ITNs. An IDP in a camp
just outside Dili voiced his concerns regarding targeted
and incomplete distribution:
They distributed bed nets, but just for pregnant women and
children.... only 14 families got bed nets, those ones came here
first they received bed nets, those ones that came later, they
have not received bed nets until now.
IDP
Fogging and larvaciding were also applied during the
emergency response, using health volunteers from IDP
Table 2: Estimates from clinically diagnosed malaria cases (rate per 1000 population) in Dili District and the Rest of the country from 
2004-2007.
Month/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
Dili Rest of the country Dili Rest of the country Dili Rest of the country Dili Rest of the country
January 28.6 21.7 13.6 10.6 27.5 19.1 30.5 18.4
February 26.2 28.8 22.5 9.9 21.9 24.2 22.8 26
March 19.6 15.6 21.3 13.5 18 31.3 27.8 19
April 24.2 13.1 30 21.3 6.8 25.3 24.5 18.4
May 22.4 15.4 9.3 18.8 2.6 16.7 18.8 12.6
June 21.6 16.6 11 14.9 4.2 15.3 14.5 11.9
July 15.5 16.3 6.4 11.3 4.3 14.9 17.1 14.7
August 10.8 14.8 8.3 10.2 5 12.2 10 11.4
September 14.1 13.7 7.7 10.1 6.3 9.8 18 11.9
October 9.5 13.2 6.3 9.6 6.8 12 17.2 11.1
November 8.2 11.7 5.6 11.5 7.4 12.7 14.5 10.1
December 5.5 13 11.2 13.4 23 12 17.4 9.4
Population was based on 2004 Census; the total country population was 924,624. Population for Dili district was 167, 777, during the crisis an 
estimated 70,000 people fled out from Dili to Districts in 2006 and 2007.Conflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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Weekly trends of suspected malaria from IDP camps in and around Dili, Timor-Leste, from Epidemiological week 22 - 50 in  2006 Figure 2
Weekly trends of suspected malaria from IDP camps in and around Dili, Timor-Leste, from Epidemiological 
week 22 - 50 in 2006.
Routine ITN distribution by the MoH in five selected districts, Timor-Leste, 2006 Figure 3
Routine ITN distribution by the MoH in five selected districts, Timor-Leste, 2006.Conflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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camps who were recruited and trained. The volunteers,
however, were only active in the first month after training,
apparently because many of them moved to other camps
and hence the program was not sustained. At the time of
interview in September 2006, fogging had been under-
taken only once, in 33 IDP camps in and around Dili.
There was also disagreement over the use of Malathion to
fog the camps. Some NGOs did not agree with its use for
fogging because of the persistence of this chemical in the
environment. These NGOs proposed indoor residual
spraying as an alternative.
Looking at insecticide spraying, I have to admit, MoH, HNI
and CRS have different ideas of what should happen. In the
end MoH did space spraying [fogging]. We were not excited
about that, MoH did it, that was the decision of MoH. We were
advocating residual spraying in the tents.
International NGO senior officer
Health promotion, inter-sectoral collaboration and 
training
Health promotion activities were undertaken in conjunc-
tion with ITN distribution and general medical assistance.
Malaria was included in the key health promotion mes-
sages provided to the IDPs; key others focused on diar-
rhoea, immunisation, and hygiene and sanitation.
International peace keeping troops and the Australian
Northern Territory Government provided assistance to the
Vector Control Working Group, and also involved in the
rainy season preparedness alongside other development
partners. High risk camps for disease transmission espe-
cially diarrhoea, malaria and dengue had also been iden-
tified.
Some training activities could not be implemented
because health staff were unable to travel to and from dis-
tricts, resulting, for example, in cancelation of service
training on microscopy.
Because of the security, our colleagues from East they don't
want to go to West to do malaria program and also for our col-
leagues from West don't want to go to the East.
MoHProgram implementer
The Global Fund and the malaria control program
The implementation of the Timor-Leste Global Fund for
Malaria Program, funded through the Global Fund to
Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, was delayed,
however an agreement was reached to extend the imple-
mentation period until December 2006, at no extra cost.
The reason for this delay was partly due to the crisis.
Future funding opportunities were missed, however,
because a new proposal was unable to be developed dur-
ing this period of instability.
the routine activities also get disturbed, for example, the Global
Fund program, actually we have to finish it but because of this
crisis we have to request for an extension until December. And
we were not able to develop proposal for the Global Fund, next
round.
MoH Program Implementer
Discussion
The malaria response during the crisis in Timor-Leste in
2006 was delivered by the MoH with the full support and
collaboration of a range of development partners [17].
The intervention was rapidly organized, and the surveil-
lance system in IDP camps in Dili promptly and effec-
tively established. Despite the crisis disrupting routine
ITN distribution and training programs, there were no
major outbreaks of malaria detected during the period of
instability.
Key questions covered in this discussion are: what factors
helped to avoid a malaria outbreak during the crisis?; who
was targeted in the interventions?; and to what extent
were opportunities seized from the crisis response for
improvement in malaria control in the long term?
What factors helped to avoid a malaria outbreak?
The national malaria morbidity trends of 2006 showed no
increase in malaria cases reported by the health system
throughout the crisis. Malaria rates were even lower in Dili
compared with the rest of the country which may well
have been due to the early and coordinated multifaceted
interventions. However, a slightly increasing trend in
malaria diagnosis in Dili towards the end of 2006 and
2007 (the first malaria season after the crisis) could be
explained by improved recording of cases and disruption
of some of the control measures and supervision during
the crisis. Trends in malaria incidence in Timor-Leste dur-
ing the crisis presents a contrast with malaria in other con-
flict-affected countries such as in the Democratic Republic
of Congo [8] in which malaria cases increased by 3.5-fold
compared with the situation before the war. Significant
increases in the national burden of malaria cases have also
been reported from Afghanistan [9] and outbreaks have
been reported in the highlands in Burundi [21].
In conflicts or in complex emergencies, factors that con-
tribute to the increase of malaria morbidity and mortality
include breakdown of health services and of malaria con-
trol programs, movement of people from low to high
transmission areas, and environmental deterioration
encouraging vector breeding [22,23]. The lack of any
major malaria outbreak in Timor-Leste during the crisis
may have been a result of the early malaria interventionsConflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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through treatment and massive ITN distribution as well as
the health promotion information provided to the IDPs
in camps. Timing may also have been fortuitous as the cri-
sis occurred toward the end of rainy season at which time
malaria incidence trends typically decrease (see figure 1).
Most people were displaced within Dili itself where access
to nets, diagnosis, treatment and care continued to be
present.
Who was targeted in the intervention?
Since the crisis, much attention and resources have been
devoted to the IDPs such as the intervention to distribute
ITNs and the vector control activities for malaria and
other vector borne diseases. The camp-focused interven-
tion reflected the mobilization of ITNs from government
(6000 nets) and NGOs (>21000 nets) to cover the needs
of IDPs with about 90% of nets being provided to IDPs in
Dili. The fogging and larvaciding also concentrated in IDP
camps in Dili with volunteers recruited from the IDPs.
Prioritizing ITN distribution to pregnant women and chil-
dren under five during the crisis was appropriate given
that child mortality due to communicable diseases includ-
ing malaria are often raised in conflict settings [24].
The multiple large IDP camps within the capital city (Dili)
was somewhat unusual and presented a specific challenge
requiring a comprehensive intervention plan. People in
camps are at higher risk of mosquito bites because of
improper shelter and overcrowding [25]. However, given
that the camps in Dili were established not far from the
surrounding communities, targeting only one side of the
community (IDPs) and neglecting others (nearby com-
munities) who share the same living environment (the
city of Dili) is unhelpful. It was noted that the vector con-
trol interventions, particularly larvaciding and fogging,
only targeted IDP camps, while community (non-IDPs)
living within a few metres from IDP camps were not tar-
geted with such interventions. Due to the proximity of the
two communities, an outbreak of malaria or other vector
borne disease would have impacted on both these sec-
tions of the Dili community. Therefore, in the future
when displacement occurs in urban areas as seen in Dili
in 2006, the malaria control interventions such as ITN dis-
tribution, vector control measures, and health promotion,
should be targeted at the entire urban population rather
than just those in IDP camps. Insecticide impregnated
tents could also be usefully considered, especially given
the difficulty of hanging nets in a tent structure.
To what extent were opportunities seized from the crisis 
response to improve the malaria control program over the 
longer term?
Malaria cases in IDP camps were mostly diagnosed using
a syndromic approach. There are two implications that
arise; one is directly related to the IDPs as they did not
gain access to better diagnosis; the other relates to the
health system more generally which missed the opportu-
nity to characterize the species of parasites causing
malaria in Dili city. There was an opportunity available to
undertake more reliable testing given that the IDPs were
concentrated in camps. Although it may have been diffi-
cult to conduct microscopy examination in camps, access
to other parts of the city including the hospital and avail-
able laboratory, were still present and logistical difficulties
could have been overcome. The RDTs had been brought
in to the country soon after the crisis but they were not
used. Had the RDT tests been done, the parasite species
could have been identified which would have been bene-
ficial for both clinicians and health managers in forecast-
ing appropriate antimalarial drug treatment needs.
The decision taken by the MoH and its partners during the
crisis response considered health service delivery structure
in IDP camps as a "temporary service" rather than as a
"permanent structure". This may have prevented the pro-
vision of microscopy and RDT services in camp settings.
As a result of this policy, a number of 24-hour fixed clinics
had to be closed down in July 2006 with the intention
that the IDPs can use health services available at Commu-
nity Health Centres. The assumption was that having
sophisticated health delivery at camp settings would only
encourage people to stay in camps and thus could prolong
the crisis. However, this highlights some of the limitations
of seizing the momentum from the crisis to improve
aspects of information and health system functioning.
The procurement of RDT and artemether-lumefantrine at
that time of the crisis was justified because the risk assess-
ment predicted potential disease outbreaks including
malaria. Had the outbreak occurred at that time, the coun-
try was already prepared to respond.
In June 2007 the MoH replaced the previous protocol
with a new protocol [26] which prescribed the use of RDT
and ACT in malaria control in Timor-Leste. ACT has been
shown to be effective in treating drug-resistant falciparum
and vivax malaria in Papua, Indonesia [27]. It has been
used in emergency situations across the globe, and is
increasingly becoming standard treatment in malaria
endemic countries [8]. The crisis generated some financial
resources through the WHO component of the Flash
Appeal, which was used to procure, in large quantities,
both artemether-lumefantrine and RDT for Timor.
Although the policy for changing the treatment protocol
from sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine to ACT had been
approved in June 2007 [26], the MoH had not iself pro-
cured ACT and RDT at that time but was able to use the
ACT and RDT donated by WHO to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the newly approved treatment protocol. The
crisis effectively facilitated the implementation of the pol-
icy in relation to malaria.Conflict and Health 2009, 3:11 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/3/1/11
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This crisis also provided an opportunity for Timorese
health authorities to take charge of the operation, as dem-
onstrated by the fact that health coordination structures,
including the vector control and health promotion work-
ing groups were chaired by Timorese MoH staff as
opposed to the earlier crisis in 1999, in which the NGOs
had been the key players in delivering services and train-
ing [28]. In addition, no sidelining of local actors in
responding to the crisis occurred, as happened in previous
emergency responses in 1999 in Timor-Leste [29,30] or in
Cambodia [31].
The crisis caused the loss of resources from the Global
Fund as the country was unable to apply for a malaria
grant in Round 6. Therefore, the government had to use its
own resources to sustain the malaria control program.
This highlighted a lesson for bilateral and multilateral
donors to ensure flexibility in funding mechanisms in
fragile states and unstable settings.
Conclusions
The crisis response for malaria in 2006 brings both posi-
tive and negative lessons for future malaria control pro-
grams, particularly among urban displaced populations.
The positive side of the crisis response was that malaria
control activities were collaboratively and rapidly organ-
ized by the MoH, UN Agencies and the NGO community,
and was effectively coordinated by the MoH. The overall
response conformed with the Roll Back Malaria Strategy
and the crisis contributed to a positive longer term policy
change. It was a Timorese-led intervention. The response
is likely to have contributed to the lack of any major
malaria outbreaks during the crisis.
The negative side of the crisis on malaria is that it dis-
rupted training programs, impeded the MoH in attracting
Global Fund resources, and the intervention was overly
camp- focused rather than having an emphasis on the
whole city.
Future crisis responses in which IDP camps are estab-
lished in city areas, as was the case in Dili, deserve consid-
eration. The intervention response must be planned
beyond the IDPs alone, and adequate resources and
expertise should be made available to assure a whole-of-
city approach. Research should be advocated to improve
malaria control in both normal and emergency circum-
stances in urban underserved areas in which displaced
populations are present.
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